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Foreign Policy Making and the U.S. 




This paper offers an insight into Washington’s foreign policy establishment and its vision of European 
integration under the Nixon administration. It argues that President Nixon and his National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, managed to formulate many important aspects of foreign policy at the 
White House. From a realist perspective, the Nixon-Kissinger team saw the emergence of a new 
world order and in it the evolvement of European integration in a way different from previous 
U.S. administrations. The paper begins by discussing the Nixon administration’s realist approach 
to foreign policy before analyzing President Nixon’s determination to make decisions on foreign 
relations at the White House. Next, the paper examines the main features of the Nixon-Kissinger 
team’s vision of European integration. It concludes that, as realists, the Nixon administration 
supported integration in Western Europe, yet Washington was ambivalent if a united Europe with 
increasing self-confidence and self-assertiveness would be in the U.S. national interest. Henceforth, 
the European integration process had to be, in the Nixon-Kissinger view, taking place under U.S. 
control in the form of the consultative mechanism and the U.S. military umbrella.
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President Richard Nixon, in office from 1969 to 1974, left a visible mark on U.S. 
foreign policy making during his term in office. Nixon preferred to formulate 
U.S. foreign policy with only a few National Security Council officials and 
ignored traditional diplomacy insisting that U.S. decisions on foreign affairs 
were to be made at the White House. With the advice and assistance from 
Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, President Nixon became the 
key foreign policy maker in the U.S. administration at the time. This led to the 
centralization of foreign policy making in the hands of the President and his 
National Security Advisor. This characteristic of U.S. foreign policy making in 
the Nixon presidential years contributed to the changed nature of the U.S. 
vision of the process of European integration. An examination of archival 
records reveals two important views of the Nixon administration regarding 
European integration: The U.S. embraced the emergence of a European 
community in the multi-polar international order while the evolution of such a 
community on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean was expected to occur 
under U.S. leadership. This paper sheds light on the main features of the 
Nixon administration’s foreign policy making before concentrating on the 
process of European integration from the U.S. perspective. Having looked 
at Europe and the world through realist lenses, the Nixon administration 
had a fresh view of U.S. national interests and threats in a changing world 
environment, and thus developed a new image of European integration 
that would help the Nixon administration to perpetuate U.S. interests and 
defend its nation from potential dangers.
Nixon’s realist approach
U.S. foreign policy making in the Nixon presidential years was framed by a 
realist approach which seeks to maximize the realization of states’ national 
interests. Through the lenses of a realist, the discipline of international 
relations studies nation-states competing for survival, predominantly 
making use of military power in the pursuit of this goal. In other words, 
the realist approach is built on four main assumptions: (i) nation-states are 
the principal actors in global politics (ii) self-interest is the main motivation 
for nation-states’ actions (iii) the main concern of nation-states is the 
balance of power in the international system; and (iv) it is the relationship 
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between or among nation-states (not domestic politics) that decides how 
one nation-state reacts to the others (McCormick 2010: 102).
Realists stress the constraints placed on politics by human nature and the 
state of anarchy in the international system. The combination of these two 
factors makes international relations a domain full of power and interest. 
Morgenthau, a leading theorist of realism, once emphasized that “human 
nature has not changed since the days of classical antiquity” (Morgenthau 
and Thompson 1985: 17). In the realist view, human nature is basically 
egotistical, and therefore is prone to immorality. This had been put forth 
by Machiavelli, in politics “it must be taken for granted that all men are 
wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their 
minds when opportunity offers” (Machiavelli 1979). According to the realist 
approach, morality in the realm of foreign affairs is fundamentally decided 
by what is good for the nation-state and its position in world politics. Thus, 
foreign policy in the realist view is full of conflicts. Nation-states do the 
maximum to protect and foster their own interests and watch the other 
nation-states’ activities with wariness. Power politics become dominant 
in global politics because the key concerns of every nation-state are the 
distribution of power and the maximization of its own power.
The Nixon administration’s foreign policy was more realist in its approach 
than that of previous presidents (McCormick 2010: 103). It was built on 
the balance of power among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, 
Western Europe and Japan. The goal was to make the United States 
reduce the cost of global hegemony and make use of a large amount 
of regional power to further U.S. interests. In this way, the United States 
would sustain its predominance in world politics. Especially, the politics of 
Nixon influenced the process of Western European integration and made 
crucial decisions with respect to the war in Vietnam, détente with the 
Soviet Union and the opening towards China. Together, they made the 
Nixon administration build a distinctive foreign policy with new focuses. 
The difference in the Nixon administration’s foreign policy was clearly 
stated in its first State of the Union on 18 February 1970, which was self–
reflected by President Nixon as “more than a record of one year. It is this 
Administration’s statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match 
a new era of international relations” (Nixon 1970).  President Nixon and his 
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administration judged that building a long lasting peace needs a foreign 
policy guided by three fundamental principles: 
“-- Peace requires partnership. Its obligations, like its benefits, must 
be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all 
friendly nations.
-- Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would 
threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, 
we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be 
aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations. At the same time, 
our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of 
others. We - like others - must place high priority on enhancing our 
security through cooperative arms control.
-- Peace requires a willingness to negotiate. All nations - and we 
are no exception - have important national interests to protect. 
But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building 
the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our 
own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree 
among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts 
and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all 
nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners 
in its maintenance” (Nixon 1970).  
These three principles implied that the United States would reduce its global 
responsibility and engage other states to share the burden of preserving 
the world order. This new approach to foreign policy also implied that the 
Nixon administration would defend U.S. interests by using its military power. 
In addition, it implied that the United States would prefer negotiations as 
the policy of choice in dealing with various international issues. In general, 
this U.S. foreign policy was to a large extent different from that in the 
postwar administrations which placed much emphasis on U.S. ability and 
responsibility to carry the burden for building a “Free World” (Fousek 2000: 
130). Richard Nixon took office during an unusually fluid time in global 
politics: The economies of Western Europe, Japan, and China, ruined by 
World War II, had recovered fast in the late sixties. With the emergence 
of new economic powers and centers, the bipolar power structure of the 
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postwar era, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, had 
been replaced by a multi–polar world. Even though the United States was 
still the most powerful state in the world, the relations with the Soviet Union 
and China, and the Vietnam War had shown the limits of its strengths. 
The grand strategy, developed by President Nixon and National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger to adjust U.S. foreign policy to the new multi–polar 
system was deeply rooted in realism. The core of this strategy was to expect 
U.S. allies to pay for their own military defense, though the United States 
remained willing to aid in defense if necessary. The Nixon administration 
desired to pursue peace through sustaining a partnership with U.S. allies:
“First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the 
freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we 
consider vital to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall 
furnish military and economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the 
nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of 
providing the manpower for its defense” (Nixon 1969).
This realist response to the new situation actually reflected their strategic 
goal: the balance of power.
Richard Nixon was considered as a President who arrived at the White 
House with more knowledge of foreign affairs than previous ones. He 
once stated clearly: “I’ve always thought this country could run itself 
domestically without a president. All you need is a competent cabinet 
to run the country at home. You need a president for foreign policy; no 
secretary of state is really important; the president makes foreign policy” 
(Small 1999: 59). In reality, foreign policy drew his attention the most during 
his presidency (Hoff 1994: 4). 
Confronting the global developments of the late 1960s, President Nixon 
and his administration designed a new foreign policy approach for the 
United States based on the principles of the balance of power.  Though 
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global politics of the late 1960s was typically described as a rigid, bipolar 
period with an international system split into two hostile blocs, the Nixon 
administration saw the emergence of new powers: Japan, China and 
Western Europe. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, 
these would-be powers would escalate the changing contour of world 
order. A pentagonal balance would characterize the global political, 
economic and military structure as President Nixon indicated:
“…as we look ahead 5, 10, and perhaps 15 years, we see five 
great economic superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, 
the Soviet Union, mainland China, and, of course, Japan…. These 
are the five that will determine the economic future and, because 
economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future 
of the world in other ways in the last third of the century.”
This vision of a future world order inspired the Nixon administration to 
encourage the development of a balance of power in the modern 
world through U.S. détente with the Soviet Union, the normalization of 
political relations with China and more evenhanded relations with Japan 
and Western Europe. President Nixon explicitly explained the views of his 
administration’s foreign policy as follows:
“We must remember the only time in the history of the world 
that we have had any extended period of peace is when there 
has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes 
infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor 
that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the 
United States is powerful: I think it will be a safer world and better 
if we have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, 
China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against 
the other, an even balance” (In an interview published in Time 
magazine on 3 January 1972).
Or
“The only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of 
power…and history shows us that nothing so drastically escalates 
the danger of war as such an imbalance” (Nixon 1972: 1110-1111)
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National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger even made it clearer in his 
address to the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council of 
Northern California on 3 February 1976:
“We must strive for equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond 
it to promote the habits of mutual restraint, a coexistence, and, 
ultimately, cooperation. We must stabilize a new international 
order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate goal 
must be to transform ideological conflict into constructive 
participation in building a better world” (Kissinger 1976).
With such a realist approach to foreign policy, the Nixon administration 
achieved significant diplomatic successes: ending the Vietnam War, 
signing the first major arms control agreement with the Soviet Union (SALT 
I), and opening up towards China. This realist approach to foreign policy 
during the Nixon administration reflected a fundamental departure from 
the policy stance in the U.S. leadership during the postwar period.
Along with a realist approach to foreign policy and a fresh view of the 
role of the U.S. in a new world environment, the Nixon administration 
reevaluated the U.S. position to redefine its national interests and threats. 
In his well–known book “Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal 
of American National Security Policy during the Cold War” published in 
1982, John Lewis Gaddis argued that Nixon and Kissinger redefined what 
constituted threats. In previous administrations, threats were defined in 
terms of an enemy’s ideology. This was because ideology determined 
behavior (Gaddis 1982: 282). The Nixon administration’s definition of threats 
was fundamentally based on an enemy’s actions. In a White House press 
briefing on 18 December 1969, Kissinger stated that: “We have always 
made it clear that we have no permanent enemies and that we will 
judge other countries, including Communist countries, and specifically 
countries like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not on 
the basis of their domestic ideology” (Kissinger 1979: 192). Implicitly, the 
Nixon administration claimed that the fact that the United States and the 
Soviet Union had two different ideologies, capitalism and communism 
respectively, did not constitute a threat to Washington. However, the 
combination of both hostility and capability embedded in the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union was threatening to the U.S. 
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Along with a change in understanding what constituted a threat, the 
Nixon administration reshaped the relationship between threats and 
interests. In the preceding administrations, perceived threats would define 
policy interests, particularly the threats from communism. Henceforth, 
containment of communism had become an interest in and of itself 
without considering “the precise way in which communism as a unified 
force might endanger American security” (Gaddis 1982: 105). Yet, the 
Nixon administration placed emphasis on defining what they thought to 
be the national interest and then defined threats to be what would harm 
that national interest. This redefinition allowed the Nixon administration 
to have more freedom in building and developing foreign relations with 
communist nation states. As Gaddis observed, the United States was 
able to “feasibly work with states of differing, even antipathetic, social 
systems as long as they shared the American interest in maintaining global 
stability” (1982: 283).
Foreign policy made at the White House
Bureaucratic resistance has been what U.S. Presidents have to overcome to 
achieve their desired policy. Even if there is no resistance from bureaucratic 
bodies, the process of implementing policies is likely to produce outcomes 
which are not the same as a President’s policy preferences. As a result, 
U.S. Presidents tend to employ administrative strategies to exert an impact 
on the making and implementation of foreign policy. 
During his term in office, President Nixon and National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger were the leading figures in the making of U.S. foreign policy. 
In his memoirs, Nixon recalled: “From the outset of my administration… 
I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House. Therefore, I 
regarded my choice of a National Security Advisor as crucial” (Nixon 1990: 
349). From his observation, Robert Dallek reflected in “Nixon and Kissinger: 
Partners in Power” that: “On the administration’s third day in office, Henry 
began implementing Nixon’s plan to ensure White House dominance of 
foreign policy” (Dallek 2007: 100).  On 1 September 1969, President Nixon 
sent a telegram to Secretary of State (Rogers), Secretary of Defense 
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(Laird) and Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) from Colorado Springs 
(Colorado) where he was attending a National Governors Conference to 
instruct these senior officials that all public communications and official 
communications had to be cleared by the White House.
“I have been disturbed in recent days by the lack of teamwork 
in the conduct of national security affairs. Consequently, I am 
reaffirming my policies with respect to this matter.
1. Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public 
communications on matters of known or potential Presidential 
interest must be carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant 
to the President for National Security) for consistency with 
Presidential policy and for coordination with the Departments 
and agencies who share overlapping interests and responsibilities. 
Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or inter-
departmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance. 
2. Official communications: All official communications with policy 
implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, 
the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires 
close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the 
White House and your Department as well as among Departments.” 
In the realm of foreign affairs, President Nixon fundamentally based his 
approach on presidential control. He developed a strategic approach 
to an administrative presidency which allowed the President to have a 
powerful role in the supervision of bureaucracy, which was necessary in 
order to achieve his foreign policy goals. He made a clear statement: “If 
we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come, we had to 
begin with a basic restructuring of the process by which policy is made” 
(Nixon 1970). 
Accordingly, the power of cabinet members decreased and the power 
of Nixon’s most trusted advisor Henry Kissinger increased. In reality, Henry 
Kissinger became one of the most powerful men in Washington. Kissinger’s 
offices were set up in the West Wing’s basement, “from which he could 
have easy access to the President” (Dallek 2007: 100). This is also what 
Richard Helms observed: “they alone would conceive, command, and 
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control clandestine operations. Covert action and espionage could be 
tools fitted for their personal use. Nixon used them to build a political 
fortress at the White House” (Weiner 2007: 293). Such a centralization of 
policy making and implementation enabled President Nixon and Kissinger 
to obtain their policy preferences because they would not have to go 
through a decision making process with many departments and agencies, 
and thus they could limit opposition.
Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence from June 1966 to 
February 1973, supposed that “Richard Nixon never trusted anybody”, 
and that Nixon did not believe in the capacity of departments and 
agencies such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (the CIA), therefore, “Nixon insisted on isolating himself” from the 
Washington bureaucratic agencies he did not have confidence in.
“Very early in the Nixon administration it became clear that the 
President wanted Henry Kissinger to run intelligence for him and 
that the National Security Council staff in the White House, under 
Kissinger, would control the intelligence community. This was the 
beginning of a shift of power away from the CIA to a new center: 
the National Security Council staff” (Ranelagh 1986: 50). 
Former Deputy Director of Intelligence at CIA Ray Cline described how 
the role of the CIA declined during the presidency of Nixon: 
“Nixon and his principal assistant, Dr. Kissinger, disregarded 
analytical intelligence except for what was convenient for 
use by Kissinger’s own small personal staff in support of Nixon-
Kissinger policies. Incoming intelligence was closely monitored 
and its distribution controlled by Kissinger’s staff to keep it from 
embarrassing the White House...” (Cline 1976: 216).
According to Cline, Helms and the CIA were employed mainly “as an 
instrument for the execution of White House wishes” (Cline 1976: 216).  
It is noticeable that Gaddis pointed out that the centralization of policy 
making and its implementation were crucial in order to attain the Nixon 
administration’s foreign policy agenda. This they accomplished “to a 
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remarkable extent, they succeeded [in achieving their goals], but only 
by concentrating power in the White House to a degree unprecedented 
since the wartime administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt” (1982: 273). 
Saul Landau even showed the existence of “a secret foreign policy 
apparatus” in the Nixon years. Such an apparatus allowed President 
Nixon to ignore the established bureaucratic bodies which still saw the 
Cold War through ideological lenses and were likely to oppose his foreign 
policy decisions. 
“Nixon created a special finance committee with its own funds, 
the Finance Committee to Reelect the President, headed by 
commerce secretary Maurice Stans, a White House controlled 
political grouping independent of the Republican party…and, 
finally, a secret foreign policy apparatus headed by Kissinger 
and designed to circumvent the clumsy and stagnant national 
security bureaucracy” (Landau 1988: 103).
Indeed, the foreign policy agenda during the Nixon years was established 
centrally at the White House and the drivers of the foreign policy making 
process were President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger. Accordingly, U.S. views and attitudes towards the European 
integrative process between 1969 and 1974 were established with great 
influence from the White House. 
A vision of European integration
At the core of the Nixon-Kissinger team’s vision of European integration lay 
the European Community as a force in a multi-polar world. In the evening 
of 29 July 1967, Richard Nixon delivered a speech to the Bohemian 
men’s club in the Bohemian Grove near San Francisco. In this remarkable 
address, Nixon evaluated the main forces at work in the world and 
discussed U.S. foreign policy. Nixon showed that a new world was coming 
with new leaders, new people and new ideas. A world in which De Gaulle, 
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Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek were still on the world stage with the 
U.S., however, new leaders were taking power from Churchill, Adenauer, 
Stalin, Khrushchev, Nehru and Sukarno. This would be a world in which a 
new generation would be growing up, a generation born after World War 
II and thus with no real experience of it. It would be a world in which no 
“ism” had the potential to imprison peoples and nations on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. After depicting to the Bohemian men and the guests the 
new landscape of the world, Nixon directed their attention particularly to 
Western Europe: 
“Twenty years ago Western Europe was weak economically and 
dependent on the United States. It was united by a common 
fear of the threat of Communist aggression. Today, Western 
Europe is strong economically and economic independence 
has inevitably led to more political independence. The winds of 
détente have blown so strongly from East to West that except 
for Germany most Europeans no longer fear the threat from the 
East. The consequences of this change are enormous as far as 
NATO is concerned. As Harold Macmillan puts it, ‘Alliances are 
kept together by fear, not by love’. Even without De Gaulle, the 
European Alliance would be in deep trouble” (Nixon 1967).
He underlined that Western Europe was in good economic condition. Their 
economic independence enabled them to design policies unfavorable 
to the U.S.: The “economic strength of Western Europe thwarted their 
progressive designs in that area. They faced increased demand for 
consumer goods from the Russian people. They looked down the nuclear 
gun barrel in the Cuban confrontation” (Nixon 1967).
Two years later when Nixon arrived at the White House in 1969, his 
administration reviewed U.S. policy to freer world trade and reaffirmed 
that the continuation of the policy was in U.S. interest, but emphasized 
that a number of foreign countries were competing fully with the United 
States in world markets. This implied that economic competition from 
Western Europe led to the disappearance of the traditional surplus in the 
U.S. balance of trade. The United States had been at its peak when the 
Second World War ended in 1945. Yet, the relative decline in its global 
predominance was starting to become more evident. This concern had 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XX (70) - 2014
67
been revealed in the Press Briefing by the President’s National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger on 18 December 1969:
“For about 20 years after the end of the war, American foreign 
policy was conducted [through a] Plan, that is, [through] the 
notion of a predominant United States, as the only stable 
[country] with the maxims and the inspiration that guided the 
Marshall country, the richest country, the country without whose 
leadership and physical contribution nothing was possible, and 
which had to make all the difference for defense and progress 
everywhere in the world.
Now whichever Administration had come into office would have 
had to face the fact, I believe, that we have run out of that 
particular vision. Conditions have changed enormously. We are 
now in a world in which other parties are playing a greater role. 
They have regained some of their self-confidence. New nations 
have come into being. Communism is no longer monolithic and 
we, therefore, face the problem of helping to build international 
relations on a basis which may be less unilaterally American” 
(Press Briefing, Kissinger 1969).
The U.S. economy was producing less but the other economies were 
producing more.  By the early 1970s, with the shrinking of gold reserves 
and the rising of inflation, the Nixon administration had to float the dollar 
against the currencies of other countries which eventually led to a severe 
depreciation. But the U.S. government under the Nixon administration 
made a contribution towards promoting a world of multi-polar relations 
and creating a liberal international environment that was characterized 
by its open-market and capitalist traditions. In that global setting, the 
European Community, which was in the process of deeper economic 
integration, was foreseen by the Nixon administration to be an emerging 
power and would be an important leverage to create an even balance 
in the international system.
“When we see the world in which we are about to move, the 
United States [is] no longer in the position of complete pre 
eminence or predominance [and] that is not a bad thing. As a 
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matter of fact, it can be a constructive thing. …We now have a 
situation where four economic powers [the Soviet, China, Japan, 
and Western Europe] have the capacity to challenge [the U.S.] 
on every front” (Nixon 1971).
Not only had the Soviet Union gained a military strength comparable to 
that of the United States, but Japan and Western Europe were vigorous 
competitors with the United States for markets. This meant that the world 
was now reaching an order called: a multi-polar world.
Along with his administration’s concept of a multi-polar world with five 
powers, President Nixon sent signals that he would be in support of 
developing and sustaining the European Community as a pillar in that 
multi-polar world. After his discussions with French President Charles De 
Gaulle in 1969, President Nixon indicated his agreement with De Gaulle 
about building a strong and independent European Community:
“[De Gaulle] believes that Europe should have an independent 
position in its own right. And, frankly, I believe that too … the world 
will be a much safer place and, from our standpoint, a much 
healthier place economically, militarily and politically, if there 
were a strong European Community to be a balance … between 
the United States and the Soviet Union” (Chace 1973: 96). 
President Nixon restated his administration’s support for developing the 
European Community as a balance in the multi-polar world at a National 
Security Council meeting in the presence of British Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson in January 1970: 
“I have never been one who believes the U.S. should have control 
of the actions of Europe … I have preferred that Europe move 
independently, going parallel with the United States. A strong, 
healthy and independent Europe is good for the balance of the 
world” (Doc. 56, FRUS 1969-1976).   
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger also showed U.S. encouragement 
for deeper integration in the European Community when he stressed that:
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“‘Efforts to create a more coherent European voice in our NATO 
are in net interest’. Kissinger even wrote to President Nixon about 
European coherence ‘European coherence would be quite 
consistent with what you have said about the desirability over the 
longer run of our being able to deal with Europe as a true and 
more equal partner’”(Kissinger 1979: 385). 
This U.S. perspective of the integration process in the European Community 
was clearly summarized in Nixon’s Report to Congress on 18 February:
“We favor a definition by Western Europe of a distinct identity, 
for the sake of its own continued vitality and independence of 
spirit. Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the 
European Community has not diminished. We recognize that 
our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe’s evolution, 
and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. 
We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified 
Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the 
West as a whole” (Nixon 1970).
Though encouraging the development of European unity in a multi-polar 
world in which the main pillars (the European Community, the United States, 
Japan, the Soviet Union and China) represented equal forces and strengths 
to sustain the structure of peace in international politics, President Nixon 
still wanted to prolong the spirits of previous U.S. administrations that was 
to keep London, Berlin and Paris under Washington’s influence. Discussing 
the future U.S. agenda as the United States worked with Western Europe 
to build a stable world order, the Nixon administration placed emphasis 
on the transformation from predominance to partnership and affirmed 
the importance of enhancing the cooperation in political and economic 
relations between the United States and the European Community as the 
Common Market grew. In his radio address on 25 February 1971, President 
Nixon made it clear that:
“In Western Europe, we have shifted from predominance to 
partnership with our allies. Our ties with Western Europe are central 
to the structure of peace because its nations are rich in tradition 
and experience, strong economically, vigorous in diplomacy and 
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culture; they are in a position to take a major part in building a 
world of peace…Our ties were strengthened on my second trip 
to Europe this summer” ( Doc 85, FRUS 1969-1976).   
Yet, it is undeniable that U.S. policy towards European unity under the 
Nixon administration was mainly shaped by the fear that a strong and 
independent European Community would not be conductive to a healthy 
Atlantic alliance and to a strong partnership between the United States 
and Western Europe. This was underlined in President Nixon’s statement: 
“The structure of Western Europe itself - the organization of its unity 
– is fundamentally the concern of the Europeans. We cannot unify 
Europe and we do not believe that there is only one road to that 
goal. When the United States in previous Administrations turned 
into an ardent advocate, it harmed rather than help progress” 
(Nixon 1970).
The ambivalence that the European Community would be likely to emerge 
into a counterweight to the U.S. was greater with the development of 
Gaullism in France and particularly with the establishment of the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, whereby Western European countries 
were able to realize their goal of creating a European foreign policy. 
Confronting the assertiveness of Western Europe in foreign policy and 
diplomacy, the Nixon administration developed a strategic plan to ensure 
that Western European countries would have a pro-Atlantic perspective. 
The real rational behind this plan was to maintain U.S. control and influence 
over the European integration process, which was captured by President 
Nixon as “a new and mature partnership”:
“I went to Western Europe in February 1969 to reaffirm America’s 
commitment to partnership with Europe.
A reaffirmation was sorely needed. We had to re-establish the 
principle and practice of consultation. For too long in the past, the 
United States had led without listening, talked to our allies instead 
of with them, and informed them of new departures instead of 
deciding with them. Inspired by the success of the Marshall Plan, 
we had taken such pride in our leadership of the alliance that we 
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forgot how much even the origin and success of the Marshall Plan 
grew from European ideas and European efforts as well as our own.
After 20 years, the economic prostration, military weakness, 
and political instability in postwar Europe that had required 
a predominant American effort were things of the past. Our 
common success in rebuilding Western Europe had restored our 
allies to their proper strength and status. It was time that our own 
leadership, in its substance and its manner, took account of this 
fact” (Nixon 1970).
 In the course of reaffirming America’s commitment to partnership with 
Europe, the Nixon Administration placed a concentration on (i) the U.S. 
voice in the North Atlantic Alliance and, (ii) the American military umbrella 
for Western Europe.
 The U.S. voice in the North Atlantic Alliance
U.S. politicians repeatedly declared that they supported the development 
of European political and economic integration, speaking encouraging 
words but having no temptation to make suggestions how this course 
of development should take. Nonetheless, this rhetoric seemingly 
contradicted reality, as the Nixon administration insisted that European 
states consult with the United States before making any decisions which 
could affect U.S. interests. 
The alliance between the United States and Western Europe had been 
seen as the cornerstone of the U.S. postwar foreign policy. It provided 
a political framework for the U.S. engagement in Europe. It provided a 
security commitment that allowed Europe to recover from the destruction 
of the Second World War. It provided support for European unity in an 
era of prolonged tensions and confrontations. Ultimately, the United 
States wanted to sustain its predominant role in the alliance. Martin J. 
Hillenbrand, then the U.S. ambassador to Germany, indicated that the 
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Nixon administration wanted to have consultations with Western Europe 
on issues of mutual concerns before a consensus was reached among 
the Europeans. Understandably, such ideas and perspectives from 
the Nixon administration were strongly criticized by Western European 
countries, particularly France. Western European countries themselves 
prepared a draft proposal for a Joint Declaration on Atlantic relations 
without any consultations with Washington on its contents. Especially, at 
the Copenhagen European Summit in December 1973, the leaders of the 
nine member states of the European Community affirmed their strong will 
to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign 
relations. The Declaration on European Identity issued after the summit 
mentioned that the relationship between the U.S. and the European 
Community had better be built on the basis of equality.
“The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine 
— we share values and aspirations based on a common heritage 
— are mutually beneficial and must be preserved. These ties do not 
conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves 
as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their 
constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with the 
United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship” 
(Declaration on European Identity, EU Council 1973).
Already disagreeing on how to deal with the Yom Kippur War in October 
1973 and the ongoing oil crisis, European statements of this kind indicated 
that Western European countries did not want to subordinate their 
interests to the United States. As a consequence of such tensions, the 
United States persuaded the government of Willy Brandt in West Germany 
to take the lead in the Gymnich formula, an agreement reached at 
the meeting of foreign ministers at Gymnich castle in West Germany’s 
Rhineland region among the European Community member states on 10 
June 1974. The United States was treated in the agreement as a special 
partner in consultations. Authority was given to the rotating Presidency of 
the European Community Council to have consultations with the United 
States on elaborating a common European foreign policy.   
“The second point is the question of consultations. The Ministers 
were agreed that in elaborating common positions on foreign 
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policy there arises the question of consultations with allied and 
friendly countries. Such consultations are a matter of course in any 
modern foreign policy. We decided on a pragmatic approach in 
each individual case, which means that the country holding the 
Presidency will be authorized by the other eight partners to hold 
consultations on behalf of the Nine.
In practice, therefore, if any member of the EPC [European 
Political Cooperation] arises in the framework of the EPC the 
question of informing and consulting an ally or friendly state, 
the Nine will discuss the matter, and upon reaching agreement, 
authorize the Presidency to proceed on that basis.
The Ministers trust that this gentlemen’s agreement will also lead 
to smooth and pragmatic consultations with the United States 
which will take into account the interests of both sides” (Text of 
the Gymnich Formula 1974).
The Gymnich agreement was viewed as being against French political 
will as it ensured the presence of the United States in the process of 
European decision making (Junker et al. 2004: 59). Under pressure from 
Washington, a consultation mechanism, close to U.S. views, between the 
United States and the EPC was proposed by Günther van Well, Western 
German political director:
“If a member state government believes that an issue discussed 
within the EPC bears on important American interests, the US 
government should be informed. This should happen once 
consensus is reached on the matter, but before the decision is 
formulated in order to give the US government an opportunity to 
lay out its views, which the EC Nine could take into account during 
their final discussion round” (Günther van Well 21 March 1974).
This actually repeated what had been made clear in the Declaration 
on European Identity by the Nine Foreign Ministers, Copenhagen on 14 
December 1973. Regarding the relations with the United States, the Nine 
Foreign Ministers agreed that the constructive dialogue with the United 
States would be maintained. 
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“The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine—
we share values and aspirations based on a common heritage—
are mutually beneficial and must be preserved. These ties do not 
conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves 
as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their 
constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with the 
United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship” 
(Declaration on European Identity, EU Council 1973).
In addition, the Ottawa Declaration, a new declaration on Atlantic 
relations, was approved and published by the North Atlantic Council at a 
ministerial meeting in Ottawa on 26 June 1974. In addition to clauses on 
economic cooperation and security issues, the Declaration once again 
reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining the consultation mechanism in 
the Atlantic alliance:
“The Allies are convinced that the fulfillment of their common 
aims requires the maintenance of close consultations […], they 
are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to 
strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all 
means” (Declaration by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial 
Session on 19 June 1974).
With a strong determination to have a role in European affairs, the U.S. 
government placed an emphasis on maintaining consultations between 
the two shores of the Atlantic. Consultations between the European 
Community and the United States on economic, diplomatic, political 
and security issues served as a means to send Washington’s messages 
to Western Europe and formed a basis for Washington to get to know 
Western European plans and intentions. In case such plans and intentions 
were in conflict with U.S. interests, Washington would be able to make its 
opinions heard before an agreement among the Europeans was reached. 
Ultimately, the Nixon administration maintained its influence on European 
affairs in general and the European integration process in particular. 
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The U.S. military umbrella for Western Europe
The Nixon administration was fully aware of the need of Western Europe 
for U.S. defense commitments in the region. The crucial role of the United 
States in protecting Western Europe could be seen through Washington’s 
contribution to NATO. The United States “has two-thirds of NATO’s GNP, 
contributes about half of the direct costs of NATO’s defense, and provides 
the nuclear shield” in Western Europe (Doc 4, FRUS 1969-1974). The Nixon 
administration hence realized what the Europeans wanted to have on 
the defense side:
“The main objectives of our European allies are (a) to keep the 
United States physically committed to the defense of Western 
Europe, so that the engagement of our nuclear power is assured; 
and (b) to buy a right to be consulted by the United States on 
anything affecting their security”(Doc 4, FRUS 1969-1974).
Nonetheless, the U.S. military umbrella for Western Europe was not taken 
for granted. The Nixon administration linked its commitments for military 
presence in Western Europe with certain economic and political conditions:
“Out of this dynamic deal, our allies get not only the protection of 
our military power but some negotiated degree of participation 
in US political decisions that affect their destiny. By committing 
our resources and sharing our discretion in limited ways, we try to 
get our allies not only to do as much as possible for the common 
defense, but also to support our efforts to build a workable world 
order, especially by making sensible security arrangements with 
the Soviet Union” (Doc 4, FRUS 1969-1974).
President Nixon indicated very clearly the relation between US defense 
commitments in Western Europe and the region’s trade policy in a cabinet 
meeting on economic policy on 10 April 1969 in Washington. Discussing 
with members of the cabinet and particularly with Secretary Maury Stans 
who was going to have a trip to Europe, President Nixon underscored:
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“Americans and Europeans have had some protectionist 
problems in the short run, but we have to make clear that this 
policy cannot be permanent […]. Our mid-western friends here in 
America will stick with us on NATO but if we start fooling around 
with their soy beans, their votes are gone. Maury [Stans], if I were 
you, I would point out the growing isolationism in America. […] 
There is no question about what the new leadership stands for, 
[…] but we face a political problem at home. If the American 
people get the impression that the European economy is turning 
inward, the Europeans can forget about political cooperation; 
no administration could survive supporting their case” (Doc 19, 
FRUS 1969-1974).
After a deep analysis of the consequences of the European policy of 
inwardness or protectionism on the economic situation and political 
views of the U.S., the 37th President of the United States did not hesitate in 
directing his Secretary on what to do during the upcoming trip to Europe: 
“Maury, you have to use great discretion on this and not refer to it publicly 
at all. But tell them our problem. They don’t hesitate to tell us theirs” (Doc 
19, FRUS 1969-1974).
The Secretary needed to let the Europeans know that they had to lift their 
trade restrictions on U.S. exports generally, and U.S. agricultural exports 
to their market particularly, in return for a U.S. freeze of troop levels in 
Europe. The President made it clear that the traditional support of the 
U.S. would be provided on the condition that a united Europe did not 
counter U.S. interests and the broader framework of Atlantic partnership. 
The protectionist policy of the European Community was seen by the 
President and the U.S. Congress as a signal of hostility and confrontation. 
This was exactly what the United States did not expect to have after 
making substantial efforts in economic, political and defense spheres 
for the European countries to be united in prosperity and security. In a 
nationally televised address on 15 March 1974, President Nixon publicly 
showed his administration’s increasing pressure on Western Europe by 
connecting military commitment to economic and political performance: 
 “Now the Europeans cannot have it both on the security front 
and then proceed to have confrontation and even ways. They 
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cannot have the United States participation and cooperation on 
the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and 
even hostility on the economic and political fronts […] In the event 
that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with 
economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find 
it almost impossible to get Congressional support for continued 
American presence at present levels on the security front […] we are 
not going to be faced with a situation where the Nine countries of 
Europe gang up against the United States – the United States which 
is their guarantee for security. That we cannot have” (Nixon 1974).
The strategic connections of economic, political and security interests were 
a crucial factor in Washington’s approach to the European integration 
process. The Nixon administration was certain that the integrative process 
in Western Europe could not be smooth and achievable without U.S. 
military assistance. The threat of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Western 
Europe was, therefore, put on the negotiation table when the Europeans 
wanted to pursue a policy which in Washington’s view harmed U.S. 
interests. This was discussed by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger: 
“Nixon: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same 
situation. The Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the 
security front where the American role is indispensible to their 
survival and confrontation and at times even hostility on the 
economic front.
Kissinger: And political front. That I think would be excellent.”
(Telcon Kissinger/Nixon 1974)
Believing that without the U.S. military umbrella the European Community 
would be an economic giant but a military pygmy, the Nixon administration 
had a strong bargaining tool in its negotiations with the Europeans. The 
leaders of the European Community were made to understand that 
their economic and political integration process would be implemented 
successfully only if they continued to be supported from Washington on 
the security front. Other concerns must have also been on the mind of 
President Nixon when he spoke at a Cabinet-level meeting of the Council 
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on International Economic Policy:
“…have one hell of a time acting as a bloc. They do not get along 
with each other. The French don’t get along with the Germans, 
the Germans don’t get along with the British. It will be some time 
before they can learn to act as a group. This means we have to 
work with the heads of government in the various countries and 
not that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels” (Doc 
100, FRUS 1969-1974).
Conclusion
With a strong interest in foreign policy, President Nixon and his National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger steered the course of U.S. foreign policy 
making. They shared a well-defined perception of international politics 
and economics. Being led by realism, the Nixon-Kissinger team was aware 
of changes that were taking place in the world. The emergence of a 
new world order made them view the process of European integration 
somewhat differently from previous U.S. administrations. Though the United 
States during the Nixon presidential years still supported movements for 
integration in Western Europe, Washington could not hide its fear that 
a united Europe with increasing self-confidence and self-assertiveness 
could oppose U.S. interests. Therefore, European integration had to, in 
the Nixon-Kissinger view, take place under the influence of the U.S. The 
consultative mechanism allowed Washington to discuss issues before the 
European Community made important decisions. By keeping a security 
commitment to the European Community and by sustaining bilateral 
relations with the core nations of the Community, the Nixon administration 
not only maintained strong ties with Western Europe but also ensured that 
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